AUTHORITARIAN LEGACIES IN POST–NEW ORDER INDONESIA: EVIDENCE FROM A NEW DATASET

Sharon Poczter*

Cornell University

Thomas B. Pepinsky*

Cornell University

Democratisation has fundamentally changed the formal institutional structure of Indonesian politics, but a wealth of contemporary research has demonstrated that the informal mechanisms of power and influence have survived the transition. This article uses a unique, hand-collected dataset of information on Indonesian public figures to empirically catalogue the changes and continuities in Indonesian politics since democratisation. Our results provide quantitative evidence of a substantial shift in Indonesia's political economy over the last decade and a half: the simultaneous rise of the private sector and decline of the military and the state as avenues to political influence at the national level. Our evidence also suggests that the origins of this shift pre-date democratisation itself.

INTRODUCTION

The democratisation of Indonesia in 1999 represented a fundamental break in the formal institutional structure of Indonesian politics. For the first time since 1955, Indonesians took part in free, competitive, multi-party elections in which the identity of the chief executive was not foreordained. However, many scholars of Indonesian politics and political economy have noted not only differences but also continuities between New Order and post–New Order politics (see, for example, Robison and Hadiz 2004; Buehler 2014; Winters 2014). An especially notable aspect of these continuities concerns the backgrounds of members of Indonesia's political elite: many of the politicians who occupy prominent positions in post–New Order Indonesia either started their political careers under the New Order or rose to political power by drawing on the political or economic connections that they established under the New Order. Yet recent scholarly analyses of the political legacies of the New Order among contemporary Indonesian politicians are inevitably selective, designed to illustrate mechanisms of political continuity

rather than to provide a systematic overview of the backgrounds of elites in democratic Indonesia.

This article provides a panoramic, quantitative overview of political change and continuity between New Order and post–New Order Indonesia. It relies on a unique, hand-coded dataset on the biographical, educational, professional, and political backgrounds of 1,646 Indonesian politicians and elites active in the post-Soeharto era. These rich data can be used to provide a more systematic descriptive analysis of Indonesia's elite than is possible from a purely qualitative approach. We demonstrate that our dataset replicates quantitatively what we think we know, from qualitative research, to be true about the demographic characteristics of Indonesian politicians in the post–New Order era. We then use the data to examine the career backgrounds of politicians across political parties, the demographic and partisan predictors of the career backgrounds of members of the elite, and the differences in these backgrounds across age cohorts. In particular, we are interested in whether experiences in the private sector, the bureaucracy, and the military[1] serve as conduits to political prominence or power (or both), as they did prior to the regime change.

Our analysis yields three primary findings. First, parties differ substantially in the career backgrounds of their members. For example, elites linked to Golkar, the National Mandate Party (PAN), or the People's Conscience Party (Hanura) are more likely to come from the private sector than those linked to other parties, whereas elites linked to Golkar, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI–P), or the Democratic Party (PD) are more likely to have military backgrounds than those linked to other parties. Second, significant correlations exist between the professional backgrounds and demographic characteristics of elites. Elites with private-sector backgrounds, for instance, are more likely to have been born in Greater Jakarta, whereas those with bureaucratic backgrounds are more likely to have been born elsewhere. Third, and perhaps most striking, differences across age groups reveal a remarkable rise in the number of elites with private-sector backgrounds: younger elites, even those whose careers began under the New Order, are more likely to be drawn from the private sector than from the bureaucracy or the military. This finding is remarkably similar both for Indonesia's political elite—those with party affiliations—and for our entire sample of elites. We interpret this last finding as evidence of a substantial shift in Indonesia's political economy over the past half century. We conclude that the democratisation of Indonesia itself hastened the decline of military- and state-linked elites, even though the rise of the influence of private-sector elites can be dated to the late authoritarian period. At the national level, at least, governmental and military careers are no longer the central corridors to elite status and political power that they were in the early New Order period.

Our findings have important implications for Indonesian economic policymaking, which depends on the composition of the country's elite, and for Indonesian democracy more broadly. The gradual marginalisation of military-linked political elites under the New Order led to a shift away from the military's having an active role in the management of state-owned enterprises, as

---

1. We use 'military' as shorthand for military and police, because the police were part of the the national armed forces until 2000.

illustrated by the ouster of army officer Ibnu Sutowo as the head Pertamina in the 1970s (Glassburner 1976). Our analysis reveals that private-sector—not bureaucratic—interests have risen in the military's place. This augurs further consolidation of private-sector interests as central forces shaping Indonesian economic policy-making. Our findings also illustrate the partisan divides in elites' career backgrounds in ways that have never before been possible. Through multivariate analysis, for example, we can dismiss the critique that partisan differences are simply incidental products of partisans' different demographic or educational profiles. An implication of this finding is that partisan control of Indonesia's parliament will matter for economic policy-making as well, which is especially important in the current administration of Joko Widodo (Jokowi).

LITERATURE REVIEW

Indonesia's democratic transition in 1999 brought to an end more than three decades of authoritarian rule under Soeharto's New Order regime. Although Indonesia's democratic consolidation dates to 2004, the year of the first direct presidential election, the most significant institutional changes were in place by the elections of 1999.[2] These inaugural post–New Order elections marked the break from the managed political competition of the New Order's regime, during which Golkar was the dominant political organisation and its two opposition parties were constrained from exercising any check on Soeharto's authority. From 1999 on, Indonesia emerged as a competitive democracy with dozens of political parties vying for seats. Political decentralisation, implemented in 2001, allowed democratic political competition to flourish across hundreds of local jurisdictions as well.

Fifteen years later, Indonesia is a democratic success story. It holds consistently free and fair elections, its military has retreated from actively intervening in politics, and the country has avoided descending into the chaos of ethnic or religious conflict. As Aspinall (2010) and others note, however, this success comes with considerable limitations to the quality of the country's democracy as well as to its economic equality. The problems include, for example, poor horizontal and vertical accountability (Slater 2004), weak rule of law (Horowitz 2013: 233–46), rampant corruption (McLeod 2000; Butt 2011), material inequality (Winters 2014), and persistent influence by powerful interests from the New Order era (Robison and Hadiz 2004). This last issue—in particular, the continuity among politicians in the New Order and the post–New Order periods—is the focus of this article.

Buehler (2007, 2014), Mietzner (2010), and Choi (2014) have provided close analyses of elites in local elections and found that many New Order politicians are active in local politics in the post–New Order era. At the national level, as well, many prominent politicians have New Order backgrounds. Post–New Order presidents Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, for example, both had political roots in the New Order; before Jokowi, only Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) remained outside of formal politics during the Soeharto regime.[3]

---

2. For more on the evolution of Indonesian democracy from 1999 onwards, see the work of Horowitz (2013).

3. Of course, Megawati's background is very different from Yudhoyono's: under the New Order, Megawati was an opposition politician, whereas Yudhoyono was a general in the

The presence of New Order military officers at the highest level of post–New Order politics is especially striking; examples include Yudhoyono, 2014 presidential runner-up Prabowo Subianto, and Hanura party founder and perennial presidential candidate Wiranto.

Systematic assessments of the extent of this persistence, however, are lacking. Only Buehler (2014) has presented a systematic accounting of the backgrounds of post–New Order political elites. As we do, he used current elected officials' curricula vitae (CVs) to categorise their professional and political backgrounds. But Buehler focused on politicians in only one province (South Sulawesi), rather than on politicians nationwide. Our broader approach complements Buehler's and Mietzner's and allows us to probe several key issues that remain unanswered in this recent literature.

DATA DESCRIPTION

Our contribution is to analyse the background of members of the elite in post-Soeharto Indonesia in the most comprehensive way possible. We do this by analysing the CVs of a large number of Indonesian elites and politicians active in the post-Soeharto era. CVs are a particularly useful source of information on the sociological and economic antecedents of political power, because they identify their subjects' birthplaces, educational attainments, professional experiences, and political positions held to date. In addition, the data are dynamic by construction, enabling analysis of changes in the political landscape over time. There are some limitations to the data: some CVs are incomplete, for example, and there is a certain amount of subjectivity in determining who warrants inclusion in the dataset (as we outline below). In addition, CVs, by their nature, include only the positions that an individual has actually occupied, and not, for instance, those they may have applied to or ran for but failed to attain. This means that we cannot know from CVs alone the entire scope of an individual's attempted forays into politics, business, or other fields. Nevertheless, the sheer scale and detail of the data, coupled with the dynamic character of CVs, give us confidence that our dataset is the most inclusive source of information currently available on the political and biographical backgrounds of Indonesia's elites.

There are many challenges to overcome in assembling information on individuals in this way. Even in advanced industrial democratic countries, accessible data on individual politicians or influential elites are rare, and, accordingly, analyses have only recently been undertaken (see, for example, Carnes 2013; Eggers and Hainmueller 2009, 2014). In emerging democracies detailed data at the individual level are even more difficult to obtain than in more established democracies, because emerging democracies are typically characterised by less transparency and more barriers to information with respect to their political processes and politicians (see, for recent examples, Fisman, Schulz, and Vig 2014; Carnes and Lupu 2015). Finally, exclusive attention to elected officials ignores informal yet

---

army. Nevertheless, we emphasise that Megawati's career began under the New Order, because this helps to illustrate how both pro- and anti-regime elements became important political actors after democratisation.

influential networks of political power that exist between political elites and others in the military, the bureaucracy, the private sector, and other spheres of influence.[4]

We use three different datasets. Owing to limitations in the format in which the data could be provided, it was necessary to enter all the data in each dataset by hand. To keep human error to a minimum, we created two separate electronic databases of the same data and had them checked for inconsistencies by a third person. The primary source of data is Tokoh Indonesia's *Ensiklopedi tokoh Indonesia* [Encyclopedia of prominent Indonesians] (TokohIndonesia.com), a comprehensive online database containing more than 600 profiles of Indonesia's formal and informal leaders, politicians, businesspeople, experts, and other professionals. It is updated regularly. Managed by politically minded journalists, Tokoh Indonesia is a media information firm that was founded with the mission of 'creating greater transparency'[5] between the media and the political sector. The firm was initially financed through donations from the public, and remained so during the period in which the data was collected.[6] Tokoh Indonesia began collecting historical data in 2000, and has been publishing data exclusively online since 2002.

Each Tokoh Indonesia profile includes, where available, the individual's CV and photograph, his or her political affiliation, names of spouses and children, and other personal information (on, for example, non-professional service to charities or non-profits, and memberships of professional clubs). Tokoh Indonesia describes its procedure for adding a profile to the encyclopedia as follows: Drawing on his or her experiences in journalism and knowledge of politics, an editor or other staff member proposes adding a person believed to be of sufficient public interest in contemporary Indonesia. Once the entire staff has agreed to add this individual, Tokoh Indonesia begins to aggregate information by contacting the primary source and arranging an interview to take place either in person or, if necessary, by telephone. If the primary source is unavailable, Tokoh Indonesia attempts to arrange an interview with one or more members of the source's family. If neither the primary source nor his or her family is available, then Tokoh Indonesia turns to secondary sources, including the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of State Secretariat, and Indonesian newspapers and magazines such as *Kompas*, *Republika*, *Suara Pembaruan*, *Media Indonesia*, *Indopos*, *Tempo*, *Gatra*, and *Berita Indonesia*. Even if the primary source is available, Tokoh Indonesia uses these secondary sources to verify information. Any additional or conflicting information from secondary sources must be confirmed by the primary source, or his or her family, before being included in the encyclopedia. Tokoh Indonesia maintains open communication with the profiled individuals and their families in case any information must be added or updated on the

---

4. In a classic essay on the key features of democratic governance, Schmitter and Karl (1991, 81) warn against '"electoralism"—the tendency to focus on the holding of elections while ignoring other political realities'. Our interest in elites who are not elected parliamentarians but have the potential to be politically influential follows in a similar spirit.

5. Translated from Bahasa Indonesia by a research assistant, Edwin Thong, after Poczter interviewed the editor-in-chief of Tokoh Indonesia via telephone in July 2009.

6. We base this statement, and the following description of how Tokoh Indonesia collects data, on Poczter's interviews with the editor-in-chief.

website, and the firm states that it has received very few complaints about the validity of any data in its publication.

Drawing on Tokoh Indonesia's online encyclopedia, we manually entered the information from each profile into our own dataset. The data entered included year and place of birth, level of education, political positions held, private-sector positions held, and political and organisational affiliations. Next, we verified the information from the main dataset by using additional data provided by a leading independent Indonesian consulting firm, PT Reformasi Info Sastra (PT Ris), which specialises in analysing political risk and investment conditions and provides clients with strategic consulting, customised research, and syndicated reports. The company's book *Who's Who in the Yudhoyono Era* contains detailed factual and analytical assessments of more than 140 Indonesian officials, policymakers, and politicians (including the entire cabinet), as well as security officials, leaders of major state institutions, senior civil servants, political party chairs, parliamentary faction heads, and directors of major state enterprises. The book supplies extensive background information on these individuals as well, but for our purposes we used only the information that would appear on their CVs.

Almost all the politicians in *Who's Who in the Yudhoyono Era* appear in Tokoh Indonesia's encyclopedia. Discrepancies between individual profiles were minor. Our third source of data was the CVs of all the members of the House of Representatives (DPR) and House of Regional Representatives (DPD) in 2004 and 2009. Members of the DPR and DPD are asked to provide the government with their CVs, which were in turn provided to us by a private source.

Finally, we augmented the existing data by developing a classification scheme that coded every career position held by every individual in our dataset. This enabled us to see how individuals with various demographic or career backgrounds entered politics. It also enabled us to characterise the extent of overlap between various types of careers among the members of the elite in our dataset, because it allowed us to record whether individuals have had multiple careers. On the basis of a close reading of the data and our familiarity with Indonesian politics, we generated 22 separate career codes. Our dataset contains 5,858 distinct careers, and we were able to assign career codes to 5,417 (93%) of them. Each career was assigned only one career code, but, because individuals have multiple careers over their lifetime, each individual in our dataset may be associated with multiple career codes. Individuals' career backgrounds appear in our dataset as two variables: *CareerTitle* ('commissioner', 'regent', or 'finance minister', for example) with 2,032 unique values, and *CareerInstitution* (such as 'Bakrie brother enterprises', 'mining', or 'PPP') with 4,403 unique values. The combination of these two variables generates the 5,858 career tokens, or unique combinations of *CareerTitle* and *CareerInstitution*.[7] We assigned career tokens to our 22 career codes without knowing anything else about the individual who holds the position. This ensured that we could not have unconsciously adjusted our coding choices because of our familiarity with a particular individual. In all, we were able to code 6,712 positions held by the 1,646 individuals in our dataset (table 1).

Our dataset has particularly rich information on members of the elite who are parliamentarians or hold other leadership positions. We also have extensive

---

7. For simplicity, in this article we refer to 'career tokens' as 'careers'.

TABLE 1 *Career Types and Frequencies*

Career code	No.	%	Notes
Parliament	1,380	20.6	All sitting members of parliament
Private sector	1,271	18.9	All private businesses
Military	806	12.0	Military or police
Education	612	9.1	Teachers, university lecturers, & higher-education administrators
Bureaucrat	550	8.2	All state officials below ministerial rank, not including ambassadors or embassy staff
Local government	401	6.0	All elected or appointed officials in district or provincial government
Civil society	349	5.2	Mass organisations, non-profit organisations, watchdog groups, etc.
Minister	299	4.5	All officials of ministerial rank
Party	260	3.9	Only party officials, not sitting parliamentarians (see Parliament)
Law	163	2.4	Only lawyers or advocates in private practice
Media	137	2.0	Those affiliated with print media, television, or radio
Religious	132	2.0	Religious figures as well as officials & staff of mass religious groups
SOEs	83	1.2	All state-owned enterprises
International	62	0.9	All bureaucrats posted abroad who are not of ambassadorial rank
Ambassador	61	0.9	Ambassadorial-level appointments only
Medical	37	0.6	Doctors, dentists, & nurses
Sports	27	0.4	Athletes & sports-association executives
Executive	22	0.3	Indonesian president, first family, & executive office staff
Independence	21	0.3	Participants in Indonesia's independence struggle
Cooperative	20	0.3	Officials in cooperatives
Celebrity	18	0.3	Presidential spouses, television personalities, etc.
Rebel	1	< 0.1	One participant in the Free Aceh movement
Total	6,712	100.0	

Note: SOEs = state-owned enterprises.

coverage of individuals with private-sector business backgrounds. Yet, because of the limitations of our data, we draw broad conclusions only with care. We do, however, emphasise two innovations relative to the existing literature on elites in post–New Order Indonesia. First, the detailed nature of the data helps to capture individuals' sociological and demographic antecedents, as well as changes in their positions over time. The recent work examining political connections in Indonesia is either qualitative (Slater 2004; Hamid 2012; Rosser 2013; Rosser and Edwin 2010) or measured only at the firm level (Fisman 2001; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006; Mobarak and Purbasari 2006). Second, because crony capitalism and cozy relations among interest groups such as the military and the private sector have been

well documented in Indonesia (Fisman 2001), data such as ours, which include information on elites with both direct and indirect political influence, allow for a much more comprehensive overview of Indonesia's political environment.

Validity

It would be reasonable to question the validity of such a large dataset constructed from three separate sources. Two primary concerns came to our minds: Could the data contained in the CVs be systematically biased by being either incomplete or deliberately misreported? And do the data have face validity—that is, do they replicate, to a reassuring degree, features that we would expect our research subjects (the post–New Order political class) to have (see Holden 2010)? We address these questions below in turn.

Indeed, some CVs are more complete than others, suggesting variation among individuals as to the parts of their professional and personal backgrounds they chose to disclose. CV data might be missing for one of two reasons. The first is that the CV does not include them. This would only be problematic for our purposes, however, if entire classes of individuals systematically under- or over-reported their backgrounds. For example, if all or several former military officials who went on to serve in parliament were unwilling to (and therefore did not) list all their prior military positions, this would compromise our inferences. Although we consider such deliberate misreporting or withholding of information to be unlikely, we cannot rule it out. More likely, in our opinion, is non-systematic misreporting by individuals owing merely to a lack of attention in fulfilling the task. This would not systematically bias our inferences, but it does suggest that we should precede our analysis with an assessment of our sample's face validity.

The second reason that data might be missing is that we cannot classify them. This is sometimes the case for data on careers, when CVs contain ambiguous abbreviations. Where necessary we distinguish between data that are missing from CVs and data that we cannot code. For example, when coding partisan affiliations (see below), we separate those individuals whose affiliation is not recorded and those whose CV stipulates no partisan affiliation. This is the case, for example, for members of the DPD.[8]

In this context, the face validity of a dataset refers to whether the dataset as a whole approximates what we would expect to find in a large sample of Indonesian political elites (Holden 2010). If, for example, a majority of the members of the elite in our dataset had been identified as Christian, or as having completed only low levels of education, it would suggest that the dataset is not face valid. On the other hand, if our dataset meets our expectations on the basis of our substantive knowledge of Indonesian politics, then we will be more confident that it captures the members of the Indonesian elite we wish it to capture. To assess our dataset's validity, then, we look first at some basic demographic information on gender, religious affiliation, and education (table 2).

Here we see that the demographic characteristics of elites in our sample are substantially representative of Indonesian political life. Most members of the

---

8. There are also cases where individuals with no partisan affiliation served in the DPR, as was possible for military representatives during the New Order. Their partisan affiliation is unrecorded.

TABLE 2 *Demographic Profiles*

Education	No.	%	Religion	No.	%
Bachelor's degree	662	40.2	Muslim	1,275	77.5
Postgraduate	614	37.3	Christian	215	13.1
Less than bachelor's	159	9.7	Not recorded	136	8.3
Military	117	7.1	Hindu	17	1.0
Not recorded	94	5.7	Buddhist	3	0.2
Total	1,646	100.0	Total	1,646	100.0

Gender	No.	%	Age	Years	
Male	1,306	79.3	Maximum	135	
Female	210	12.8	Median	60	
Not recorded	130	7.9	Minimum	28	
Total	1,646	100.0			

Note: Age is defined as 2014 minus the person's year of birth. Discrepancies are due to rounding.

political elite in Indonesia are male and Muslim, and have completed higher levels of education than the general population.[9] Contrary, however, to what we might expect from this data, only 7.1% of our respondents reported having had a military education. This percentage probably understates the actual number of military figures in our sample, because our sample seeks to capture the highest level of education for each individual, and for some military figures the highest level of education is not a military degree.

In table 3 we list elites' birthplaces, mainly by province. Greater Jakarta, or Jabodetabek, comprises the Jakarta Capital Region (DKI Jakarta) together with the neighbouring municipalities of Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi; the populations of these municipalities are subtracted from the provinces of West Java and Banten, where they are located. Elites born overseas are allocated their own category. Our study does not include separate data for North Kalimantan, which, until 2012, was part of East Kalimantan.

These results, too, broadly reflect what we would expect from a random sample of members of the Indonesian elite. The most common birthplace is Greater Jakarta, followed by East Java and Central Java. Among those in our dataset who were born overseas, the most common locations reported were London (six individuals), Amsterdam (four), and Madison, Wisconsin (three).

In the first and second columns of table 4, we complete our face-validity analysis by looking at the partisan affiliations of the individuals in our dataset, breaking them down by whether or not they have been members of the DPR at any point in their careers. Table 4 also lists the parties and their abbreviations.

---

9. The 2010 census shows that 7.5% of Indonesians over the age of 15 had completed a post-secondary degree (BPS 2014), a far smaller number than the 87.5% figure from our data.

TABLE 3 *Place of Birth*

Place	No.	%	Place	No.	%
Greater Jakarta	235	14.3	East Nusa Tenggara	19	1.2
East Java	183	11.1	Papua	18	1.1
Central Java	178	10.8	East Kalimantan	17	1.0
Unclassified	177	10.8	Maluku	15	0.9
West Java	128	7.8	Gorontalo	14	0.9
North Sumatra	94	5.7	West Papua	13	0.8
South Sulawesi	81	4.9	Central Kalimantan	12	0.7
Yogyakarta	58	3.5	Central Sulawesi	12	0.7
West Sumatra	57	3.5	West Kalimantan	11	0.7
South Sumatra	37	2.2	Bangka Belitung	10	0.6
Aceh	33	2.0	North Maluku	9	0.5
Bali	33	2.0	Jambi	8	0.5
Banten	31	1.9	Bengkulu	7	0.4
South Kalimantan	28	1.7	West Sulawesi	7	0.4
Overseas	25	1.5	Riau Islands	5	0.3
Riau	24	1.5	Southeast Sulawesi	3	0.2
West Nusa Tenggara	22	1.3			
Lampung	21	1.3	Total	1,646	100.0
North Sulawesi	21	1.3			

Note: Greater Jakarta includes the Jakarta Capital Region together with the neighbouring municipalities of Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi. Together these comprise the urban agglomeration Jabodetabek. Figures for West Java and Banten do not include individuals from these four municipalities. Our study does not include separate data for North Kalimantan, which, until 2012, was part of East Kalimantan.

Once again our results are reassuring: most of the individuals who have not been members of the DPR do not record a partisan affiliation, while most of those who are in the DPR do. Golkar, PD, and PDI–P are the most common affiliations among DPR members, reflecting that most of the individuals in our dataset were members of the 2004 and 2009 parliamentary sessions. Those members of the DPR without any partisan affiliation are those who served prior to democratisation and make up only a small portion of our sample. We also observe in this table that relatively few elites with military backgrounds have entered the DPR.

We conclude from this preliminary analysis that our results are indeed face valid, in that they reproduce, as a category, qualitative features of Indonesia's elites. This evidence is not dispositive that the data are an unbiased and representative sample, but it does suggest that a close quantitative analysis of our data will yield informative patterns in the backgrounds of Indonesia's elites.

ANALYSIS

Our analysis begins by examining differences across parties. We ask two questions: One, which parties attract politicians with private-sector experience? And, two, which parties attract politicians with military experience?

The third column of table 4 shows the number of individuals in each category affiliated with each party, broken down by whether their CVs include at least

TABLE 4 *Party Affiliation or Military Background by DPR Membership, Private-Sector Experience, and Military Experience*

Party or affiliation	Total	DPR (%)	Private sector (%)	Military (%)
Not recorded	727	2.9	23.0	14.7
Democratic Party (PD)	186	76.9	37.6	7.0
Golkar	184	69.0	46.7	3.8
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI–P)	125	80.0	37.6	5.6
Non-affiliated	91	12.1	20.9	9.9
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)	74	79.7	20.3	1.4
United Development Party (PPP)	62	69.4	33.9	0.0
National Mandate Party (PAN)	60	80.0	45.0	1.7
National Awakening Party (PKB)	48	66.7	33.3	2.1
Military or police	32	6.2	12.5	100.0
Other party	18	33.3	27.8	16.7
Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra)	16	81.2	50.0	6.2
People's Conscience Party (Hanura)	11	90.9	63.6	0.0
Crescent Star Party (PBB)	6	33.3	0.0	0.0
Reform Star Party (PBR)	3	33.3	33.3	0.0
Prosperous Peace Party (PDS)	3	66.7	33.3	0.0
Total	1,646	37.7	30.0	11.1

Note: DPR = People's Representative Council.

one instance of private-sector employment. The data reveal that most party-linked individuals in our dataset do not have private-sector experience. Among those who do, there are party-specific differences. Members of the elite linked to PDI–P, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and the National Awakening Party (PKB), for example, are less likely to have private-sector backgrounds than those linked to other parties, including Gerindra, Golkar, Hanura, PD, and the National Mandate Party (PAN). This difference reflects Golkar's reputation in the post-Soeharto era as a business-friendly party, and suggests that Hanura and Gerindra draw from a similar base of business-minded elites.[10] The comparative rarity of PDI–P figures with private-sector affiliations may be a hold-over from the New Order, during which PDI–P, as an opposition party, had no institutional access to state patronage.[11] The relative abundance of elites linked to PAN who have private-sector experience reflects the party's social base in Muhammadiyah, a relatively affluent, middle-class, modernist Muslim constituency. Our data also reveal that very few elites with a military background also have a private-sector background.

---

10. Both Hanura and Gerindra were founded by retired generals (Wiranto and Prabowo Subianto, respectively) who were close—albeit in different ways—to former president Soeharto.

11. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this conclusion.

In the fourth column of table 4, we repeat this exercise for individuals with a military background. Party-linked elites in our dataset are much less likely to have a military background than a private-sector background. In fact, in our dataset, most parties have few or no members linked to the military. Consistent with the observations of Rüland and Manea (2013, 139), the parties with the highest percentage of elites with military backgrounds are PD, Gerindra, PDI–P, and Golkar (although Gerindra's score of 6.2% simply reflects one individual—its founder, Prabowo Subianto).[12] Golkar's status as a hold-over party from the authoritarian era is also not hard to understand, while several plausible interpretations can account for the comparatively high numbers of military figures affiliated with PDI–P and PD. These groups have been the two most successful national parties, aside from Golkar, in the post-Soeharto period, so it is possible that retired generals may be seeking political power through the strongest political vehicles available. It could also be possible that powerful parties ally with former generals to forestall conflicts between military and civilian governments. Our quantitative data alone cannot adjudicate among these theories, but they do draw attention to the lingering effects of the politicisation of the military under Soeharto.

Multivariate Analysis

The cross-tabulations shown thus far suggest only a fraction of what we can learn from our dataset about members of Indonesia's political elite. To probe further, we use a multivariate framework to exploit the detailed data that we have extracted from the CVs. For the moment, we set aside questions of partisanship and examine how gender, educational type and attainment, place of birth (that is, Greater Jakarta versus elsewhere), and age relate to career outcomes. Our three broadly conceived outcomes of interest are private-sector experience, bureaucratic experience, and government experience. By 'government experience', we mean an encompassing definition of government service that includes bureaucratic experience; experience as an ambassador, executive, or minister; or other public-sector experience (table 1).

To estimate the predictive power of these background factors on career outcomes, we estimate a series of logistic regressions with a binary career indicator as a dependent variable (*Private sector*, *Bureaucrat*, and *Government*[13]) and the following independent variables: *Military*, *Bachelor's*, *Postgraduate*, *Female*, *Muslim*, *Birth: Jakarta*, and *Age*. The first three independent variables are binary variables indicating whether individuals with military education, a bachelor's degree, or a postgraduate degree are more likely to have private-sector experience than individuals with non-military education at high-school level or lower. *Female* and *Muslim* are binary variables used to test the relevance of gender and Islam, while *Birth: Jakarta* is an indicator equal to one, and zero otherwise, if the politician was

---

12. Table 4 codes Hanura as a party in which no elites in our dataset have military backgrounds. This is puzzling, given that former general Wiranto is its founder. In our source, however, Wiranto is coded as a member of Golkar, rather than Hanura, because his CV pre-dates the founding of Hanura.

13. The *Private sector* and *Bureaucrat* variables are the career codes from table 1. The *Government* variable was generated by aggregating individuals coded as *Bureaucrat*, *Ambassador*, *Executive*, *Minister*, or *Public sector*.

born in Greater Jakarta (Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, or Bekasi). Finally, *Age* captures differences by age (defined as 2014 minus the person's year of birth); we include age with a linear functional form in our baseline models and explore non-linear functional forms later, in our cohort analysis.

To analyse the antecedents for career backgrounds, we use a range of empirical specifications. First, we test the antecedents separately in a bivariate logistic regression, where the dependent variable is equal to one if an individual has a particular career background; otherwise it is equal to zero. Next, we test a more general model, which includes each independent variable. We then add a series of dummy variables for the person's political party, independently and then jointly, to investigate how changing the conditioning set of political affiliation affects the relationships we uncover. We do this for each career-outcome classification: private-sector experience, bureaucratic experience, and government experience.

We start by presenting our results for the personal attributes that predict private-sector career experience. We are interested in whether demographics (gender, religion, age, and birthplace), education (military or postgraduate, for example), and political-party affiliation are related to having a private-sector background. In our supplementary appendix we present results in which we enter each demographic variable and each party independently (supplementary tables S1 and S2, respectively).[14] Here we report only the 'saturated' specifications that include all demographic variables entered jointly, both with and without all party variables. These appear as model 1 and model 2 in table 5. Entries in table 5 represent odds ratios for the correlates of prior employment, so entries that are greater than one capture variables that predict a greater likelihood of employment in a particular career, and entries that are less than one predict a lower likelihood of employment in that career.

Our results suggest that a person's educational attainment, individually or in the joint model, does not predict having a private-sector background. Model 2 indicates that women are less likely than men to have a private-sector background, and the precision of this estimate increases when we control for party affiliation. In the bivariate model, Muslims are more likely to have private-sector backgrounds (model 5 in supplementary table S1), but this result disappears in the multivariate results. Elites born in Greater Jakarta and younger elites are also more likely to have private-sector backgrounds.

The results when controlling for party (individually and jointly) are also instructive. Net of other determinants, Golkar-linked elites are more likely than others to have private-sector backgrounds. The same is true of elites linked to PD, PAN, and Hanura. PKS-linked elites are less likely to have private-sector backgrounds. Results for other parties are either fragile or inconclusive. The multivariate results therefore confirm our earlier results for Golkar, PD, PAN, and Hanura, suggesting that these parties are more likely than others to have members with private-sector backgrounds. However, the multivariate analysis also reveals that PKS-linked elites are less likely than those linked to other parties to have private-sector backgrounds, something that our preliminary analysis did not capture. We also find

---

14. These tables are available as an online supplement to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2015.1129051.

TABLE 5 *Correlates of Employment*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Private sector	Private sector	Bureaucracy	Bureaucracy	Government	Government
Military	0.906	0.906	0.972	1.052	0.713	0.773
	(0.289)	(0.294)	(0.412)	(0.455)	(0.253)	(0.281)
Less than bachelor's	0.885	0.885	1.462	1.504	0.813	0.800
	(0.269)	(0.273)	(0.546)	(0.573)	(0.261)	(0.263)
Bachelor's	1.169	1.185	1.303	1.450	0.976	1.067
	(0.292)	(0.301)	(0.427)	(0.485)	(0.263)	(0.296)
Postgraduate	1.123	1.107	0.854	0.908	0.754	0.794
	(0.282)	(0.282)	(0.285)	(0.309)	(0.206)	(0.222)
Female	0.685*	0.656*	0.659	0.603	0.644*	0.597*
	(0.116)	(0.114)	(0.173)	(0.160)	(0.139)	(0.132)
Muslim	0.834	0.844	1.402	1.534*	1.764**	1.867**
	(0.127)	(0.132)	(0.298)	(0.333)	(0.328)	(0.356)
Birth: Jakarta	1.422*	1.421*	0.590*	0.635	0.854	0.955
	(0.217)	(0.223)	(0.144)	(0.158)	(0.159)	(0.184)
Age	0.976***	0.979***	1.051***	1.036***	1.066***	1.053***
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Golkar		2.254***		0.338***		0.508**
		(0.397)		(0.095)		(0.108)
PDI–P		1.413		0.168***		0.246***
		(0.297)		(0.079)		(0.079)
PKS		0.518*		0.382*		0.379*
		(0.163)		(0.172)		(0.144)
PD		1.460*		0.428**		0.421***
		(0.267)		(0.119)		(0.099)
PAN		1.886*		0.288*		0.328**
		(0.532)		(0.154)		(0.138)
PKB		1.270		0.270*		0.705
		(0.420)		(0.166)		(0.272)
PPP		1.189		0.126**		0.274**
		(0.349)		(0.092)		(0.115)
Gerindra		2.160				
		(1.111)				
Hanura		4.287*		0.402		0.226
		(2.738)		(0.428)		(0.242)
PBR		1.176				
		(1.451)				
PBB				0.784		3.113
				(0.886)		(2.914)
PDS		1.193				
		(1.470)				
Constant	2.159*	1.437	0.007***	0.023***	0.005***	0.015***
	(0.821)	(0.598)	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.002)	(0.007)
N	1,491	1,486	1,491	1,469	1,491	1,469
R^2	0.015	0.024	0.081	0.103	0.117	0.133

Note: Logistic regression reporting odds ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. R^2 corresponds to McFadden's adjusted pseudo-R^2 (see Menard 2000, 19–20). The reference group for educational variables (*Military, Less than bachelor's, Bachelor's,* and *Postgraduate*) comprises members of the dataset whose education is not recorded.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

no systematic differences between Gerindra, PDI–P, and PKB relative to others in these multivariate models.

We turn next to our results for members of the elite with bureaucratic backgrounds. We find suggestive evidence that gender, religion, and postgraduate education predict bureaucratic employment histories in bivariate models (supplementary tables S3–S4), but the full model (model 3 in table 5) shows that the most robust predictors of bureaucratic employment are age and having been born in Greater Jakarta.[15] The relationships for these two predictors are the opposite of what we uncovered in the analysis of members of the elite with private-sector backgrounds: older members of the dataset born outside of Greater Jakarta are the ones most likely to have bureaucratic experience. We return to the question of age in our analysis below, but we also note here that the findings on those born outside of Greater Jakarta being more likely to have bureaucratic backgrounds are consistent with recent research on the importance of the local state as a key source of political power in the regions (see, for example, Van Klinken 2014).

Several parts of our results for party affiliation and bureaucratic employment history are noteworthy. When a party variable is significant, it is always negative: party affiliation predicts a lower probability of having a bureaucratic background. However, it is important to remember that these party variables compare members of the elite who have these party affiliations with all other members of the elite, including those without partisan affiliations. As a result, they must be interpreted as the partial correlation between party affiliation and bureaucratic employment history relative to all other members of the elite, some of whom have no party affiliation. When we restrict the analysis to only those elites with party affiliations, or to only those who have served in parliament, we do not find a significant correlation between affiliation and bureaucratic employment history, either individually or jointly.[16] Net of other predictors, party affiliation does not predict bureaucratic experience among the elites in our sample.

Finally, we examine our results for elites with general government backgrounds (models 5 and 6 in table 5). As noted above, this encompasses bureaucrats as well as ambassadors, government ministers, and public-sector employees, as well as those working with the executive branch. As with bureaucratic employment, age is a strong predictor of general government employment: the older members of the elite in our dataset are much more likely to have government employment experience. Place of birth, however, is not a significant predictor of government employment experience. Rather, in both the bivariate models (supplementary tables S5 and S6) and the full models with parties, our results show that Muslims are more likely than non-Muslims to have government employment experience, and that men are more likely than women to have government employment experience. As it does for bureaucratic employment, party affiliation predicts a lower likelihood of having government employment experience. When we restrict the analysis, as previously, to only those elites with some party affiliation, we find limited evidence that those with affiliations to Golkar, PDI–P, PD, PAN, and PPP

---

15. In model 4, in which we include partisan variables as well, the *p*-value associated with having been born in Greater Jakarta is 0.068.

16. These results are available from the authors on request.

are less likely than elites with other affiliations to have histories in government employment.[17] These results are surprising, and emerge only in a model with a full set of demographic controls and with every party entered jointly, so they should be interpreted simply as indicating that elites with links to these parties are less likely than all those with other party affiliations to have government affiliations.

Multiple Employment Histories

This analysis does not consider the possibility of overlap among employment categories. A unique advantage of our data is that they allow us to examine the extent to which members of the elite move in and out of different professions. This is particularly important, given the close links in Indonesia among the military, the business sector, and the state, both under the New Order and after democratisation (for an early acknowledgment of this point, see Robison 1978). Rather than classify elites into a single category of officer, bureaucrat, or businessperson, our coding of individual career histories reflects the richer complexity of individuals' professional histories. This gives us a window onto the cross-permeation of the state, the private sector, and the military, as well as onto how this interplay is reflected in the country's most prominent members of the elite.

In table 6 we compare different types of employment to show, for example, what percentage of those in the sample with private-sector employment histories also have bureaucratic or government employment histories.

The first two panels demonstrate how many members of the elite have both a private-sector and a bureaucratic (panel A) or general government (panel B) background. In both cases we find a considerable but not disproportional overlap: elites with private-sector backgrounds are no more likely to have bureaucratic or government backgrounds than elites without private-sector backgrounds. This finding is inconsistent with an interpretation of Indonesian politics in which service of the state provides an entry point into the private sector as a means of accumulating wealth, as was common under the New Order (see Robison 1986, 342–61). While we have no doubt that this is true in individual cases, it appears that it is not consistent with the experiences of a majority of the elites in our sample.

In panel C we examine the links between the private sector and military experience alone. We find that elites with private-sector experience are less likely than those without private-sector experience to have military experience. In fact, only 1.2% of elites in our sample have both military and private-sector backgrounds (20 of 1,646), and 89% of elites who have a military background do not have a private-sector background (162 of 182). This difference is highly statistically significant. It is yet more evidence against an interpretation of Indonesian politics in which military experience is an entry point into the private sector (at least according to our sample), a common practice for retired generals during the New Order (see, for example, Bresnan 1993, 107). We emphasise here that these results do not imply that retired Indonesian military officers do not enter private business, only that such patterns are not characteristic of the most prominent national members of the elite in our sample. Indeed, we suspect that the presence of retired military officers in private-sector careers is particularly notable in the regions—outside

---

17. These results are available from the authors on request.

TABLE 6 *Combinations of Private-Sector, Bureaucratic, Government, and Military Experience*

Panel A		Total	Bureaucratic experience	
			Yes	No
Private-sector experience	Yes	494	69	425
	No	1,152	182	970
	Total	1,646	251	1,395

Note: Pearson chi²(1) = 0.90. Pr = 0.34.

Panel B		Total	Government experience	
			Yes	No
Private-sector experience	Yes	494	115	379
	No	1,152	290	862
	Total	1,646	405	1,241

Note: Pearson chi²(1) = 0.67. Pr = 0.41.

Panel C		Total	Military experience	
			Yes	No
Private-sector experience	Yes	494	20	474
	No	1,152	162	990
	Total	1,646	182	1,464

Note: Pearson chi²(1) = 35.25. Pr = 0.00.

Panel D		Total	Bureaucratic experience	
			Yes	No
Military experience	Yes	182	62	120
	No	1,464	189	1,275
	Total	1,646	251	1,395

Note: Pearson chi²(1) = 56.06. Pr = 0.00.

Panel E		Total	Government experience	
			Yes	No
Military experience	Yes	182	84	98
	No	1,464	321	1,143
	Total	1,646	405	1,241

Note: Pearson chi²(1) = 51.22. Pr = 0.00.

of Greater Jakarta — and among less prominent non-commissioned officers (see Global Security 2013), although our data do not allow us to demonstrate this.

In panels D and E, we complete this exercise by investigating the association between having a military background and having experience within the bureaucracy or in the government more generally. Here, we do find evidence that elites with military backgrounds are more likely than other elites to have bureaucratic or government experience, and these differences are highly statistically significant. These positive findings are consistent with interpretations of Indonesian politics — especially politics under the New Order — in which the military served as an entry point to positions of authority within the state, even if neither military nor governmental service had increased the likelihood of private-sector employment among members of the elite.

The Changing Face of Indonesia's Political Elite

Our final substantive analysis examines differences in backgrounds by age. This analysis brings us back to the question of change and continuity in Indonesian politics since democratisation. Our dataset is designed to reflect contemporary politics, and to capture contemporary members of the elite; however, it also contains information on a number of older or deceased members. We can use this variation in ages to examine differences in the backgrounds of elites across age cohorts (that is, actual ages for those still alive and ages implied by year of birth for those who have died). For example, the 'rise of capital' — to borrow Robison's (1986) terminology — might imply a shift away from state-sector and military members of the political elite in favour of those from the private sector. If democratisation leads to a broadening of the career backgrounds of Indonesian politicians then we should expect to find that younger members of the political elite are less likely to have military or bureaucratic backgrounds than older members who entered politics at the height of the New Order. By examining the backgrounds of elites in different age cohorts, we can more effectively chart the changing nature of Indonesian politics.

We analyse these changes by estimating a saturated model — equivalent to model 1 in table 5 — to show the probability, as a function of age, that a member of the elite has a background in the private sector, in the government or bureaucracy, or in the military. To capture the potential non-linear relationship between age and professional background, we augment that specification by adding both quadratic and cubic polynomials for age in each model.[18] Rather than interpret regression coefficients, we calculate the predicted probability of each individual between the ages of 40 and 90 (as of 2014) having each type of professional background, and then plot the resulting curves, along with the 95% confidence regions around each prediction (figure 1).

Figure 1 demonstrates the changing face of Indonesia's political elite. The older elites in our data tend to have government or military backgrounds, whereas virtually none of the younger elites do. Instead, the younger elites are much more likely to have a private-sector background. This holds for both the entire sample

---

18. Higher-order polynomials do not appreciably improve model fit, nor do they change any of our substantive conclusions.

FIGURE 1 *Employment Histories by Age: Predicted Probabilities*

(panel A) and for analyses that include only members affiliated with major political parties (panel B).

We must be careful in interpreting these results, and mindful of what we can learn about historical changes from data that focus largely—although not exclusively—on contemporary members of the political elite. We cannot rule out, for example, the possibility that a dataset compiled in the 1970s would have included more comprehensive information about private-sector elites who did not have government, bureaucratic, or military backgrounds. Our data do, however, include a number of elites from previous decades, and we have impressive coverage of elites who rose to prominence under the New Order and were still alive between 2004 and 2009. The fact that our dataset does not include many older private-sector elites is consistent with our interpretation that the core political economy of Indonesia has changed from one in which members of the elite come predominantly from the state, bureaucracy, and military to one in which they come from the private sector. If it were the case that our results are being driven from the particular sample we examine, it must be the case that elites with private-sector backgrounds were more likely to have died young than those without private-sector backgrounds (in which case they probably would not have been included in our data).

Interpreting the decline of younger members of the elite with military backgrounds requires taking into account the career trajectories of Indonesian military officers. Unlike under the New Order, today a successful military career entails that an officer be able to enter politics only after retirement, at the minimum age of 60. But the requirement that officers retire from 'operational duty' before standing for office (see Sebastian and Iisgindarsah 2013, 34) is itself one of the achievements of military reform after democratisation. We also note that the abolishment of military representation in the DPR is a primary factor in the declining numbers of military-linked members of the elite. Our analysis confirms that these legal and

constitutional changes are indeed shaping the composition of Indonesia's political elite, even if many older military officers whose careers were made under the New Order continue to enter politics after retiring.

Finally, we emphasise that these results are not necessarily (or exclusively) evidence of the effect of democratisation on the composition of Indonesia's political elite. They could also (or alternatively) reflect developments in national politics that date to the late New Order period. In the last decade of Soeharto's rule, analysts detected a shift in the constellation of elites surrounding Soeharto, who sidelined potential opponents within the Indonesian military while nurturing Muslim groups, Chinese and indigenous business allies, and his own family (see Winters 1996, 184–90; Robison and Hadiz 2004, 58–60; Pepinsky 2009, 46–61). Another interpretation of this shift in the late New Order political economy is an effort by Soeharto to generate rents more efficiently by relying on higher-quality entrepreneurs than could be found in the military and state sectors.[19] It is likely, then, that the decline of military and state backgrounds and the rise of private-sector backgrounds among members of Indonesia's political elite coincide at least in part with Soeharto's own evolving strategy of regime preservation and rent extraction. Our analysis based on age alone cannot distinguish between changes that occurred in the late Soeharto era and those that date from the early democratic era.

In order to distinguish, as best we can, changes originating towards the end of the New Order from post–New Order changes, we identify the elites in our data according to whether their first reported career — of any type — began before or after 1998. Cross-tabulations of New Order and post–New Order members of the elite, by background, appear in table 7.

These results demonstrate that members of the elite whose careers began after 1998 are less likely to have a military, bureaucratic, government, or private-sector background. Clearly, democratisation has resulted in fewer members of the political elite with military or state backgrounds (or both). There is also evidence, however, that the rise of the private sector as a source of the country's elite (figure 1) must have begun prior to democratisation. In other words, the rise of private-sector elites is at least partially a legacy of changes to Indonesia's political economy that date to the New Order period.

CONCLUSION

This article began with the question of change versus continuity in Indonesian politics after the New Order. Using a unique, hand-coded dataset, we have examined the career backgrounds and demographic profiles of a large number of prominent members of Indonesia's political elite. The differences we uncover in career backgrounds by partisan affiliation, as well as the demographic predictors of elites' career histories, reflect the new complexity of contemporary Indonesian politics at the national level. At the same time, the fact that factors as basic as birthplace (that is, in Greater Jakarta versus elsewhere) predict career histories so well reflects a clear legacy from New Order Indonesia, in which the local state was a key avenue to political power in the regions — whereas among Greater Jakarta–born members of the elite, the private sector dominates. We also find evidence

---

19. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this interpretation.

TABLE 7 *Career Histories, before and after Democratisation*

| Panel A | | Total | First career under New Order | |
			Yes	No
Private-sector experience	Yes	434	252	182
	No	943	438	505
	Total	1,377	690	687

Note: Pearson chi²(1) = 16.04. Pr = 0.00.

| Panel B | | Total | First career under New Order | |
			Yes	No
Bureaucratic experience	Yes	238	180	58
	No	1,139	510	629
	Total	1,377	690	687

Note: Pearson chi²(1) = 74.96. Pr = 0.00.

| Panel C | | Total | First career under New Order | |
			Yes	No
Government experience	Yes	389	291	98
	No	988	399	589
	Total	1,377	690	687

Note: Pearson chi²(1) = 132.29; Pr = 0.00.

| Panel D | | Total | First career under New Order | |
			Yes	No
Military experience	Yes	182	139	31
	No	1,464	551	656
	Total	1,646	690	687

Note: Pearson chi²(1) = 77.74; Pr = 0.00.

of a dramatic change in the career backgrounds of politicians across age groups. This shift in the composition of Indonesia's political elite away from the military and the state and towards the private sector represents a fundamental change in Indonesia's political economy at the national level. Even if many members of the elite in contemporary Indonesia still have bureaucratic or military backgrounds, our data demonstrate a meaningful shift towards private-sector backgrounds among younger political elites coming to prominence in the post–New Order era.

There are, however, several important considerations to keep in mind in light of these results. While our analysis focuses on change and continuity in Indonesian

politics as captured through the types of individuals who rise to national prominence, there are many other dimensions through which to examine the legacies of authoritarian politics on emerging democracies. These include legacies of structural power, inequality, bureaucratic decay, patterns of popular mobilisation, and many others. Moreover, as others have argued, the decline of the state and the military as routes to political power in Indonesia does not in any way imply that they are no longer politically relevant — see, for example, the work of Rosser, Roesad, and Edwin (2005), on 'politico-bureaucrats', and Mietzner (2013, 103–6), on the military. Our findings on partisan differences in career histories and the changing composition of members of the political elite must be interpreted alongside the broader legacies of institutions, inequality, and mobilisation, among other contexts. Indeed, our finding that the rise of members of the political elite with private-sector backgrounds dates to the late New Order period shows how important it is to take into account informal changes in the social bases of authoritarian politics (Pepinsky 2014) alongside the discrete changes in regime type that accompany democratisation.

We also emphasise that we do not have a complete model of the process through which members of the elite enter into our dataset. Although we are confident in the face validity of our data, we acknowledge that our findings do not generalise to all members of the Indonesian political elite as a class (with the exception that our results do encompass all sitting parliamentarians in 2009). This limitation also prevents us from making stronger claims about the effects of birthplace, gender, religion, and other influences on career outcomes, which is why, throughout this article, we have been careful to describe our findings as predictive ones on the members of the elite in our dataset, rather than as estimates of causal effects. Future work that follows the leads of Eggers and Hainmueller (2009, 2014) and Fisman, Schulz, and Vig (2014) may be able to use our data or expand on our approach in order to gain causal leverage on key theoretical issues. It is also worth noting that there are new sources of data pertaining to more recent legislative elections in Indonesia — including both winners and losers in these elections — being made available through sources such as API Pemilu (PemiluAPI.org).

Finally, our analysis is limited in that it covers national members of the political elite rather than provincial or local members. Patterns we uncover at the national level may not emerge in regional analyses. We suspect, in particular, that local bureaucrats and local military figures will be far more prominent in local politics in democratic Indonesia. We can only speculate about why this is the case, but Van Klinken's (2014) study of the provincial city of Kupang finds that local notables emerged almost exclusively from the local state during both the late colonial and early post-colonial periods. The critical difference between national and provincial politics is the relative weakness of the private sector at the provincial level, a function of both the centralisation of the New Order political economy and the pervasive influence of the military in provincial and local businesses. More analyses, such as those by Buehler (2007), Mietzner (2010), and Choi (2014), are critical for understanding just what legacies the local authoritarian state in Indonesia have left on local politics. Such analyses will profit by borrowing from our methodological approach, in particular by focusing on individuals' multiple-career histories and by examining age effects alongside other demographic and political factors that may explain the prominence of certain local members of the elite.

REFERENCES

Aspinall, Edward. 2010. 'The Irony of Success'. *Journal of Democracy* 21 (2): 20–34.

BPS (Badan Pusat Statistik). 2014. 'Sensus penduduk 2010 [2010 population census]'. Accessed 2 December. http://sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php.

Bresnan, John. 1993. *Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Buehler, Michael. 2007. 'Local Elite Reconfiguration in Post–New Order Indonesia: The 2005 Election of District Government Heads in South Sulawesi'. *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* 41(1): 119–47.

———. 2014. 'Elite Competition and Changing State–Society Relations: Shari'a Policymaking in Indonesia. In *Beyond Oligarchy*, edited by Michele Ford and Thomas B. Pepinsky, 157–75. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Butt, Simon. 2011. *Corruption and Law in Indonesia*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Carnes, Nicholas. 2013. *White-Collar Government: The Hidden Role of Class in Economic Policy Making*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Carnes, Nicholas, and Noam Lupu. 2015. 'Rethinking the Comparative Perspective on Class and Representation: Evidence from Latin America'. *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (1): 1–18.

Choi, Nankyung. 2014. 'Local Political Elites in Indonesia: "Risers" and "Holdovers"'. *Sojourn* 29 (2): 364–407.

Eggers, Andrew C., and Jens Hainmueller. 2009. 'MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics'. *American Political Science Review* 103 (4): 513–33.

———. 2014. 'Political Capital: Corporate Connections and Stock Investments in the U.S. Congress, 2004–2008'. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 9 (2): 169–202.

Fisman, Raymond. 2001. 'Estimating the Value of Political Connections'. *American Economic Review* 91 (4): 1095–102.

Fisman, Raymond, Florian Schulz, and Vikrant Vig. 2014. 'The Private Returns to Public Office'. *Journal of Political Economy* 122 (4): 806–62.

Glassburner, Bruce. 1976. 'In the Wake of General Ibnu: Crisis in the Indonesian Oil Industry'. *Asian Survey* 16 (12): 1099–112.

Global Security. 2013. 'Indonesia - Military Personnel'. Last modified 15 September. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/indonesia/personnel.htm.

Hamid, Sandra. 2012. 'Indonesian Politics in 2012: Coalitions, Accountability and the Future of Democracy'. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 48 (3): 325–45.

Holden, Ronald R. 2010. 'Face Validity'. In *Corsini Encyclopedia of Psychology*, edited by Irving B. Weiner and W. Edward Craighead, 637–38. New York: Wiley.

Horowitz, Donald L. 2013. *Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Leuz, Christian, and Felix Oberholzer-Gee. 2006. 'Political Relationships, Global Financing and Corporate Transparency: Evidence from Indonesia'. *Journal of Financial Economics* 81 (3): 411–39.

McLeod, Ross H. 2000. 'Soeharto's Indonesia: A Better Class of Corruption'. *Agenda* 7 (2): 99–112.

Menard, Scott. 2000. 'Coefficients of Determination for Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis'. *The American Statistician* 54 (1): 17–24.

Mietzner, Marcus. 2010. 'Indonesia's Direct Elections: Empowering the Electorate or Entrenching the New Order Oligarchy?'. In *Soeharto's New Order and Its Legacy: Essays in Honour of Harold Crouch*, edited by Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, 173–90. Canberra: ANU E Press.

———. 2013. 'Veto Player No More? The Declining Political Influence of the Military in Postauthoritarian Indonesia'. In *Democracy and Islam in Indonesia*, edited by Mirjam Künkler and Alfred Stepan, 89–108. New York: Columbia University Press.

Mobarak, Ahmed Mushfiq, and Denni Puspa Purbasari. 2006. 'Corrupt Protection for Sale to Firms: Evidence from Indonesia'. Working paper, University of Colorado Boulder.

Pepinsky, Thomas B. 2009. *Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes: Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2014. 'The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism'. *British Journal of Political Science* 44 (3): 631–53.

Robison, Richard. 1978. 'Toward a Class Analysis of the Indonesian Military Bureaucratic State'. *Indonesia* 25: 17–39.

———. 1986. *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Robison, Richard, and Vedi R. Hadiz. 2004. *Reorganizing Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets*. London: RoutledgeCurzon.

Rosser, Andrew. 2013. *The Politics of Economic Liberalisation in Indonesia: State, Market and Power*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Rosser, Andrew, and Donni Edwin. 2010. 'The Politics of Corporate Social Responsibility in Indonesia'. *The Pacific Review* 23 (1): 1–22.

Rosser, Andrew, Kurnya Roesad, and Donni Edwin. 2005. 'Indonesia: The Politics of Inclusion'. *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 35 (1): 53–77.

Rüland, Jürgen, and Maria-Gabriela Manea. 2013. 'The Legislature and Military Reform in Indonesia'. In *The Politics of Military Reform: Experiences from Indonesia and Nigeria*, edited by Jürgen Rüland, Maria-Gabriela Manea, and Hans Born, 29–56. New York: Springer.

Schmitter, Philippe C., and Terry Lynn Karl. 1991. 'What Democracy Is . . . and Is Not'. *Journal of Democracy* 2 (3): 75–88.

Sebastian, Leonard C., and Iisgindarsah. 2013. 'Taking Stock of Military Reform in Indonesia'. In *The Politics of Military Reform: Experiences from Indonesia and Nigeria*, edited by Jürgen Rüland, Maria-Gabriela Manea, and Hans Born, 29–56. New York: Springer.

Slater, Dan. 2004. 'Indonesia's Accountability Trap: Party Cartels and Presidential Power after Democratic Transition'. *Indonesia* 78: 61–92.

Van Klinken, Gerry. 2014. *The Making of Middle Indonesia: Middle Classes in Kupang Town, 1930s–1980s*. Leiden: Brill.

Winters, Jeffrey A. 1996. *Power in Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesian State*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

———. 2014. 'Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia'. *Indonesia* 96: 11–33.